Once Again America Gets the Shaft

On September 9, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin called his American analogue George W. Bush with an urgent bulletin: Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban and Moscow-supported Northern Alliance, had been assassinated in Afghanistan by two suicide bombers posing as journalists. Putin warned Bush-league of "a foreboding that something was about to happen, something long in preparation." Two days later al-Qaida struck the Usa.

The catamenia immediately after ix/11 was in retrospect the high point in U.S.-Russian relations in the three decades since the Soviet collapse. U.S.-Russian cooperation in the initial stages of the Afghan state of war appeared to be transformative, and Moscow likened the anti-terror cooperation to the anti-Hitler coalition in World War 2. The common enemy was Islamic fundamentalism and together the ii great powers would defeat information technology. Today, as Transitional islamic state of afghanistan is over again ruled by the Taliban and U.Due south.-Russian relations stand at their lowest ebb in decades, it is instructive to inquire why the anti-terror partnership collapsed and what the Taliban'south victory might hateful for future relations.

The aftermath of nine/11

Afghanistan was a complex issue for Washington and Moscow because the U.S. had been instrumental in helping defeat the Soviets in their Afghan war by supporting the mujahideen — thereby helping to create what in 1994 became the Taliban. But 9/11 happened i yr into Putin's kickoff term in part, when he was interested in improving ties with the Westward. Putin believed that the road to restoring Russia as a prosperous great power lay though enhanced economic cooperation with the U.S. and Europe. The terrorist attacks provided an opportunity to partner with America and elevate Russia's international standing.

Moscow was in a unique position to offer communication and assist given its detailed knowledge of Afghanistan and feel working with the Northern Alliance. Still, Putin initially balked at the idea of the U.S. establishing bases in Russian federation'south "backyard" to assist its military campaign. Indeed, he unsuccessfully tried to dissuade Central Asian leaders from accepting the bases, and so changed form after realizing that he could not prevent their establishment, and the U.South. opened two bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

During fall 2001, Russia shared intelligence with the U.S., including information that helped American forces find their fashion around Kabul and logistical information about Afghanistan's topography and caves. U.S. officials agreed that this information had contributed to the initial success of Operation Enduring Freedom and the rout of the Taliban. But xx years ago, it was already clear that the Kremlin'due south definition of who was a terrorist and how to understand the "global state of war on terror" differed from that of the U.S. authorities. Equally the Russian ambassador to State of israel later said in affirming why Russia does non regard Hamas or Hezbollah every bit terrorist organizations, Russia defines a terrorist as someone who "intentionally conducts acts of terror in Russian territory, or against Russian interests away." In 2001, the Kremlin was preoccupied with the terrorist threat from Russia's restive N Caucasus. In as much equally there were Chechens fighting with al-Qaida in Afghanistan and there were al-Qaida operatives in the North Caucasus, Moscow was willing to acknowledge the global nature of the terrorist threat. Only it was unwilling to participate in counterterrorism cooperation where terrorists did not straight threaten Russian interests.

Even so, during autumn 2001 it appeared that the U.South.-Russian relationship had entered a new era of cooperation. This was Vladimir Putin's reset, his endeavor to use the terrorist attacks on the U.South. past partnering with America as the cornerstone of his bid to restore Russia to its rightful place as a major global thespian. Putin secured an Oval Office coming together with Bush and visited the president's ranch in Crawford, Texas. During his spoken language at the Russian Embassy in Washington in November 2001 he said, "I am sure that today, when our 'destiny again meets history' we volition be not only partners, but we may well be friends."

Misplaced expectations and changing narratives

The problem with the post-nine/11 honeymoon was that U.Southward. and Russian expectations from the new partnership were seriously mismatched. An alliance based on one limited goal — to defeat the Taliban — began to fray soon after they were routed. The Bush-league administration's expectations of the partnership were limited. In return for Moscow's assistance in the state of war on terror, Washington believed that information technology had enhanced Russian security by "cleaning upward its backyard" and reducing the terrorist threat to the country. The administration was prepared to stay silent most the ongoing war in Chechnya and to work with Russia on the modernization of its economy and energy sector and promote its admission to the World Merchandise Organization.

Putin's expectations were considerably more extensive. He essentially sought what Dmitri Trenin called an "equal partnership of unequals," hoping that Russia's support for the U.Southward. would return it to the global board of directors later a humiliating post-Soviet decade of domestic and international weakness. The anti-terrorist coalition was the vehicle, merely the longer-term goal was to seek U.S. recognition of Russia as a great power with the right to a sphere of influence in the mail service-Soviet space. Putin also sought a U.S. delivery to eschew any further eastern enlargement of NATO. From Putin'southward point of view, the U.South. failed to fulfill its role of the post-ix/11 deal.

The Kremlin'south narrative about the root causes of the deterioration in relations since nine/11 is all-encompassing: Washington'south unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the invasion of Iraq, Bush's "Liberty Agenda" and U.Due south. back up for "color revolutions" in Eurasia, and the enlargement of NATO to the Baltic states. In other words, the U.S. failed to capeesh what Russian federation saw equally its legitimate security interests. Yet throughout the two decades since 9/11, counterterrorism has remained an area where the countries have sometimes cooperated. The U.S. provided Russia with information which helped thwart domestic terrorist attacks in 2017 and 2019; Moscow warned Washington almost the Tsarnaev brothers who detonated bombs at the Boston Marathon in 2013, although that information was non acted on. Joint counterterrorism work remains challenging considering both countries' intelligence services are wary of sharing too much information. Yet history shows its value, and it could provide a possible artery for cooperation vis-à-vis a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

U.S-Russian relations in Transitional islamic state of afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal

The Kremlin has adopted a dualistic approach toward the U.S. withdrawal from Transitional islamic state of afghanistan. On the one hand the Schadenfreude at the U.Southward. defeat is palpable. The Kremlin and its media outlets have crowed over the chaotic scenes at Hamid Karzai International Airport, declared the U.Due south. an unreliable partner, and argued that Taliban victory shows a Western system cannot be imposed on a country with such a dissimilar culture. On the other hand, the Russians would have preferred that the U.Due south. stay in Afghanistan with a pocket-size military force to fend off terrorists and maintain stability. Russia'southward neighborhood will become more than dangerous now. Moscow has been negotiating with the Taliban for some years in apprehension of the U.South. leaving and hosted a delegation in March, but still designates the group as a terrorist arrangement. The Kremlin is so far non-committal about whether it would recognize a Taliban-led regime, although the Russian ambassador in Kabul has said that Russia can work with the Taliban.

When Putin met U.S. President Joe Biden in Geneva in June, he made clear that Russia would object to any new American military machine presence in Central Asia. Moscow believes the U.S. overstayed its welcome in Kyrgyz republic and Uzbekistan and actively contributed to the U.Southward. losing its bases there. It would like to use the U.S. defeat in Transitional islamic state of afghanistan to increase its influence in Key Asian countries, promising protection confronting extremist groups to demark them more than closely to Russian federation. Yet Russian federation itself fears the impact of terrorist groups increasing their presence in Transitional islamic state of afghanistan. Fighters from the N Caucasus and Central Asian migrants based in Russian federation have joined the Islamic State Khorasan and other groups and could in one case over again target Russia and its neighbors. An unstable Taliban-led Afghanistan could pose a straight threat to Russian security.

U.South. withdrawal means that Transitional islamic state of afghanistan will become a regional rather than international issue going forward. It signals the end of the U.S. equally a major presence in Central Asia and the reality that Russia and China, along with Pakistan and Islamic republic of iran, are the primal outside players. Just it is too early on to conclude that Russia is a winner from the U.South. withdrawal. That volition depend on what kind of authorities the Taliban is able to establish and how involved Russian federation is willing to go in Afghan diplomacy.

The demise of the mail 9/eleven U.Southward.-Russian partnership shows that Moscow and Washington have worked together best when they accept a clear, limited goal involving similar interests, be it the defeat of Nazi Germany or the defeat of the Taliban 20 years ago. In one case those goals were achieved with the defeat of the common enemy, and in the absence of broader common interests and values, further partnership has foundered on fundamentally different worldviews and mutual suspicions.

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Source: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/08/the-impact-of-september-11-on-us-russian-relations/

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